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Abstract
In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation
principle obtains in full generality if allocations are modelled as the product
set of outcomes and verifiable information. Incentive constraints fully characterize the implementable set of these product-allocations. The revelation
principle does not generally hold when an allocation is modelled as only an
outcome. However, any outcome of an implementable product-allocation is
also implementable under this restricted modelling, provided that the mechanism designer can expand communication by adding unverifiable messages and
restrict communication by limiting the use of messages. A canonical representation of such mechanisms is presented, implying that an inalienable right of
the agent to withhold evidence does not affect implementability.
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Introduction

Focusing exclusively on the role of asymmetric information, mechanism design studies
the extent to which the distribution of information restricts economic allocations.
Ideally, the theory places no limitations on the ability of economic agents to interact
and communicate, in principle allowing any type of game or mechanism to govern
their communication and interactions.
The revelation principle plays a crucial role in enabling mechanism design to
achieve, for a given information structure, its goal of analyzing unrestricted mechanisms. The principle is well understood in “standard mechanism design”, which I
define as a context in which economic agents can fully commit themselves to any
possible mechanism but cannot credibly reveal their private information in any other
form than by exchanging (unverifiable) messages.
For environments in which agents have (partially) verifiable information, the applicability of the revelation principle seems less well understood; even under full commitment. Following observations in Green and Laffont (1986), a general revelation
principle for such settings is currently not available.1 A failure of the revelation principle for these settings suggests that mechanism design with verifiability information
differs fundamentally from mechanism design without verifiability.
The main goal of this paper is to argue that there is no such fundamental difference and that the confusion concerning the validity of the revelation principle is an
artifact of the adopted modelling. More precisely, the tradition to model verifiable
information as part of the communication rather than the economic allocation causes
a failure of the revelation principle in general.
Hence, this paper’s main departure from the existing literature on verifiability
and mechanism design is that it models the presentation of the verified information
as part of the economic allocation.2 More specifically, it shows that by modeling the
economic allocation as the product set of the pay-off relevant outcomes and the payoff irrelevant provision of verifiable information (or evidence), the revelation principal
obtains as usual. Moreover, any outcome associated with an implementable productallocation of outcome and evidence is also implementable by mechanisms that limit
the implementation to pay-off relevant outcomes only, under the provision that the
following two elementary operations in the design of mechanisms are available: 1)
1

E.g., Green and Laffont (1986), Bull and Watson (2007), and Deneckere and Severinov (2008)
obtain some variants of the revelation principle only for certain subclasses of models.
2
In the context of implementation without private information, Kartik and Tecieux (2012) make
a similar point.
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broadening communication by adding (non-verifiable) messages; and 2) restricting
communication to a subset of available messages.
Because mechanism design (often implicitly) assumes the availability of both operations,3 the failure of the revelation principle is not due to a fundamental difference
of verifiability messages in mechanism design.4 Regardless of whether information is
partially verifiable, the revelation principle holds provided that verifiable information
is modelled as being part of the implementable allocation. Moreover, even if one
does not allow mechanisms to do so, the set of implementable outcomes which these
allocations imply is still fully attainable if these restricted mechanisms allow the two
rather elementary operations of broadening and restricting communication.
Instead, Green and Laffont (1986) model the presentation of verifiable information
as hardwired restrictions on the agent’s reporting structure rather than being part of
the implementable allocation. The subsequent literature on mechanism design and
verifiable information adopts this modeling approach as well. In principle, one can
however just as well capture the verifiable information as part of the economic allocation.5 It is however exactly this failure to do so that causes this literature’s struggles
with the validity of the revelation principle. A compelling reason for modeling the
verifiable information as an explicit part of the economic allocation is therefore that
it circumvents any conceptual problems concerning the revelation principle.6
Related literature
3

E.g., when motivating the agent’s restricted message sets on page 251, Green and Laffont themselves explicitly appeal to the principal’s ability to restrict the agent’s message space by imposing
severe enough punishments. Deneckere and Severinov (2008) assumption of a “worst outcome” plays
the same role; it acts as a severe enough punishment by which the principal restricts communication.
4
In standard mechanism design, the first operation is clearly also essential for the revelation
principle to hold, while the second operation is available naturally: the mechanism can always
“prevent” any off-limit message by interpreting it as some specific available message and induce the
same allocation. When there is no verifiable information, this does not affect the agent’s reporting
incentives so that preventing the agent to send additional messages is, effectively, implicit in the
model. As Example 3 illustrates, this is not the case with verifiable information. Hence, a subtle
but conceptual difference associated with the verifiability of information is the weaker ability to
restrict communication when information is (partially) verifiable. See however the previous footnote
concerning other natural features that, in mechanism design models with verifiable information,
effectively imply the ability to restrict communication as well.
5
E.g., Bull and Watson (2007, p. 79) explicitly mention this possibility but exclude it on the
basis of pay-off relevance: “the players evidentiary actions are not directly payoff-relevant. Thus,
we do not need to include evidence in the definition of the “outcome”.”
6
Section 5 shows that the subsequent set of implementable outcomes is also implementable when
the agent’s provision of evidence is modelled as an inalienable action.
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Most points and observations presented in this paper have, in some way or another,
also been raised in the existing literature of mechanism design with verifiable information or in the literature on (unique) implementation with perfect information.
Indeed, most of this paper’s findings can be understood as a reinterpretation of similar
findings and notions there. In order to put the insights of this paper in perspective,
it is therefore helpful to carefully point out its relations to previous results.
Green and Laffont (1986) were the first to note a failure of a general revelation
principal in mechanism design problems with (partially) verifiable private information. They obtain a revelation principle only under a so-called nested range condition,
where the agent’s verifiability exhibits a nested structure. They show by explicit examples that without this condition, the revelation principle in general fails. They
note that this failure limits the applicability of mechanism design to study settings
with partially verifiable information, because one cannot characterize the set of implementable allocations. Green and Laffont do not model the presentation of evidence
as part of the economic allocation and, the two examples below clarify that they
implicitly restrict the design of mechanisms.
Singh and Wittman (2001) give plausible examples of concrete economic environments for which the nested range condition of Green and Laffont is violated. For
principal-agent models that satisfy a unanimity condition on the agent’s preferences,
they derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of a social
choice function regardless of the underlying verifiability structure. The authors do
not discuss possible extensions of direct mechanisms such as broadening and restricting communication. They also do not model the presentation of evidence as part of
the economic allocation.
Bull and Watson (2007) explicitly address the validity of the revelation principle in
mechanism design with partially verifiable information and multiple agents. They do
not model the provision of evidence as part of the economic allocation and motivate
this exclusion by the fact that the provision of evidence is not directly payoff-relevant.
In addition, their mechanism design setup does not allow the operation of restricting communication. Due to both restrictions, a general revelation principle in their
context is not available, but the authors show that the principle obtains under an
evidentiary normality condition, which is closely related to the nested range condition
of Green and Laffont (1986).
Also Deneckere and Severinov (2008) report a failure of the usual revelation principle in mechanism design with partially verifiable information. They, instead, present
an extended revelation principle, which uses dynamic mechanisms. They further refine the concepts of nested information under which the revelation principle holds and
4

point to similar notions in Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Lipman and Seppi
(1995). While Deneckere and Severinov do not model the presentation of evidence as
part of the economic allocation, they, however, explicitly allow the operation of adding
non-verifiable messages, which they define as “cheap talk”. Moreover, because the authors mostly focus on principal-agent problems for which there is a type-independent
“worst outcome” for the agent, they also implicitly allow the principal to restrict the
agent’s communication, because by committing to implement the worst outcome for
a certain message, the principal can ensure that the agent will never use this message.
Deneckere and Severinov moreover express a direct interest in analyzing the effect of
ad hoc limitations on the principal’s ability to design communication rules such as
limitations on the number of messages which agent can send.
The literature on (unique) implementation with perfect information has also studied verifiable evidence (e.g. Bull and Watson, 2004, Ben-Porath and Lipman, 2012
and Kartik and Tercieux, 2012). From the perspective of this literature, the idea of
extending the outcome space as presented in this paper, is not new. In particular,
Section 4 in Kartik and Tercieux (2012) consider the same kind of extended allocation space and also show that restricting to mechanisms that consider the agent’s
evidence provision as an inalienable action does not reduce the set of implementable
outcomes.7
Analyzing the role of verifiable information in a game theoretical rather than a
mechanism design context, Forges and Koessler (2005) study communication between
players with private but partially verifiable information. Since the authors do not
follow a mechanism design perspective, they do not use the notion of mechanisms
as implementing economic allocations. Yet, the revelation principles they obtain
and their underlying proofs are closely linked to the one shown in this paper. Importantly, the authors also explicitly point out the importance of broadening and
restricting communication for expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes in their
game theoretical framework.
In addition to Forges and Koessler (2005), the revelation of verifiable information in games with incomplete information is studied in, for instance, Hagenbach et
al. (2014) and the extensive literature on (Bayesian) persuasion (e.g. Glazer and
Rubinstein, 2004 and Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). The main difference to this
literature is that players cannot commit (all) their actions to a mechanism.
7

In a private communication, the authors sent notes in which they derive the counterpart of my
Propositions 3 and 4 in a mechanism design context with quasi-linearity and transfers.
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The Green and Laffont (1986) example

This section first reiterates the example by which Green and Laffont (1986) demonstrate the failure of the revelation principle and, subsequently, illustrates how to
recover it by a natural reinterpretation of an economic allocation.
Example 1: Green and Laffont (1986)
Consider a principal and one agent, who can be of three types Θ1 = {θ1 , θ2 , θ3 }. The
set of outcomes is X1 = {x1 , x2 }. The agent has partially verifiable information, which
Green and Laffont concisely capture by type-specific message sets M (θi ) with the
interpretation that type θi can only send messages from the set M (θi ). In their specific
example they consider the sets M1 (θ1 ) = {θ1 , θ2 }, M1 (θ2 ) = {θ2 , θ3 }, M1 (θ3 ) = {θ3 }.
The agent’s utilities u1 (x, θ) are as follows:
u1 (x, θ)
x1
x2

θ1
10
15

θ2
5
10

θ3
10
15

For this example, Green and Laffont show that the direct mechanism g1 : Θ → X
with g1 (θ1 ) = g1 (θ2 ) = x1 and g1 (θ3 ) = x2 induces a game that implements the
social choice function f1 (θ1 ) = x1 , f1 (θ2 ) = f1 (θ3 ) = x2 . This is so, because type θ1 ,
who cannot send the message θ3 , optimally sends the message θ1 , which results in
x1 = f1 (θ1 ). Type θ2 , who cannot send the message θ1 , optimally sends the message
θ3 , which results in x2 = f1 (θ2 ). Type θ3 , who can only send the message θ3 , optimally
sends the message θ3 , which results in x2 = f1 (θ3 ).
Green and Laffont observe that while direct, the mechanism is not truthful, because it induces type θ2 to misreport his type as θ3 . They, subsequently, establish a
failure of the revelation principle, because a truthful direct mechanism ĝ1 that implements f1 , requires ĝ1 (θ1 ) = x1 , ĝ1 (θ2 ) = x2 , ĝ1 (θ3 ) = x2 . This mechanism is however
not incentive compatible, because it induces type θ1 to report θ2 .
We can however implement the social choice function f1 with a truthful direct
mechanism if we extend the concept of an allocation as follows. In addition to an
outcome x ∈ X, an allocation also describes a verifiable message θ ∈ Θ which the
agent is to send. Hence, let the set Y = X × Θ represents this extended set of
allocations with a typical element y = (x, θ) ∈ Y . Define utilities as follows:

u(x, θ0 ) if θ ∈ M (θ0 )
û(x, θ) =
−∞
otherwise.
6

In this extended context, a direct mechanism is a function ỹ = (x̃, θ̃) : Θ → Y from
the set of non-verifiable claims about Θ to the extended set of allocations of outcomes
X and verifiable messages about Θ.8 Its interpretation is that if the agent send the
non-verifiable claim θi , the mechanism picks x̃(θi ) ∈ X and the agent must present
the message θ̃(θi ) ∈ Θ. The direct mechanism y(θ1 ) = (x1 , θ1 ), y(θ2 ) = (x2 , θ3 ),
y(θ3 ) = (x2 , θ3 ) is incentive compatible (truthful) and implements the allocations in
X as intended by the social choice function f1 .

3

The Mechanism Design Setup

The above example suggests that by extending the concept of an implementable
allocation, one can recover the revelation principle. This section make precise the
sense in which this insight is general. It is most instructive to do so in the original
framework of Green and Laffont (1986), because it is the simplest framework to
illustrate the two additional requirements for this extension to work: The ability to
both extend and limit communication.
Hence, consider a principal facing an agent with utility function u(x, θ), which
depends on a characteristic θ ∈ Θ and an outcome x ∈ X. For concreteness, we
assume that both sets are finite: Θ = {θ1 , . . . , θK } and X = {x1 , . . . , xL } with
K, L ∈ N.9 The agent knows θ, whereas the principal only knows that θ ∈ Θ. The
agent has verifiable information represented by a correspondence M : Θ → Θ with the
interpretation that type θi can only send messages about θ from the set M (θi ). Hence,
a type θ describes both the agent’s preferences over X and an available message set.
In short, we can represent the principal-agent problem of Green and Laffont by a
structure Γ = {Θ, X, M (·), u(·, ·)}, which consists and describes all the primitives of
the principal-agent model.
Fully in line with the usual goal of mechanism design, Green and Laffont (p.448)
state their intention to “study the class of social choice functions f from Θ into X
8

Hence, claims and messages are different objects in this context and not synonyms. While we will
use û and the mechanism ỹ only as hypothetical constructs for deriving a revelation principle, they
allow the following literal interpretation. Although an agent can costlessly make any unverifiable
claim about his type, he has a prohibitively high cost to back up his claim if he cannot present the
verifiable information to substantiate it. Hence, a person with only $10 dollars in his pocket, can
claim he has $20, but has a prohibitively high cost of actually retrieving $20 from his pocket. In
contrast, a person with $20 dollars in his pocket, can claim to have $20 dollars and also produce
the $20 at zero costs.
9
All arguments naturally extend if Θ and X are subsets of some more general Euclidean spaces.
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that can be achieved despite the asymmetry of information between the two players.”
For this, they define a direct mechanism as follows.
Definition 1: A mechanism (M (·), g) consists of a correspondence M : Θ → Θ such
that θ ∈ M (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, and an outcome function g : Θ → X.
Hence, the mechanism (M (·), g) presents the agent with a single-person decision
problem in which an agent of type θ has to pick some θ but in which his choice is
restricted to his message set M (θ). Following Green and Laffont, we can describe
the agent’s optimal decision behavior as follows. Given the correspondence M (·), the
outcome function g induces a response rule φg : Θ → Θ defined by10
φg (θ) ∈ arg max u(g(m), θ).
m∈M (θ)

This leads to the following two notions of implementability.
Definition 2: A social choice function f : Θ → X is M (·)-implementable iff there
exists an outcome function g : Θ → X such that:
g(φg (θ)) = f (θ) for any θ in Θ,
where φg (·) is an induced response rule.
Definition 3: A social choice function f : Θ → X is truthfully M (·)-implementable
iff there exists an outcome function g ∗ : Θ → X such that:
g ∗ (φg∗ (θ)) = f (θ) for any θ in Θ
and
φg∗ (θ) = θ.
The example in the previous section proves that there exists social choice functions that are M (·)-implementable but not truthfully M (·)-implementable. In this
result, Green and Laffont see a failure of the revelation principle and the ensuing
problem that one cannot, in general, characterize the set of implementable social
choice functions for all principal-agent problems Γ.11
10

Because Θ is finite, the maximum exists.
Note that the agent’s decision problem involves a type-dependent action set. Hence, extending
this approach to multiple agents leads to the concern that the game induced by the mechanism
does not, strictly speaking, correspond to a Bayesian Game. In the definitions following Harsanyi
(1967), games with imperfect information require that the agent’s action sets are type-independent.
(See footnote 13 for more details and also Bull and Watson (p. 80, 2007) who point out that their
“disclosure game [...] is a Bayesian game with type-contingent restrictions on actions”.)
11
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The next two examples suggest, however, that not only the notion of truthfully
M (·)-implementability is problematic, but that the more primitive notion of M (·)implementability also raises questions. In Example 2, the specified social choice
function is not M (·)-implementable, whereas it is implementable if the mechanism
can, in addition to the messages in M (.), also condition on two non-verifiable messages. In Example 3, the specified social choice function is not M (·)-implementable,
whereas it is implementable if the mechanism can limit the messages that can be
sent.
Example 2: Too few messages
Consider a third outcome x3 by duplicating outcome x2 in the sense that each type
θ is indifferent between x3 and x2 . Hence, the set of outcomes is X2 = {x1 , x2 , x3 }
with the utility
u2 (x, θ) θ1
x1 10
x2 15
x3 15

θ2
5
10
10

θ3
10
15
15

Suppose we want to implement the social choice function f2 (θ1 ) = x1 , f2 (θ2 ) = x2 ,
f2 (θ3 ) = x3 . Then, based on the reasoning in Example 1, it is straightforward to see
that this social choice function is not M (·)-implementable, but it is implementable by
a mechanism that, in addition to reporting θ, asks for some extra cheap talk message
m̂ ∈ M̂ = {a, b} as follows

 x2 if (θ, m̂) = (θ3 , a)
g2 (θ, m̂) =
x
if (θ, m̂) = (θ3 , b)
 3
x1 otherwise.
With the concept of an extended allocation as introduced in Example 1, the incentive
compatible direct mechanism y2 (θ1 ) = (x1 , θ1 ), y2 (θ2 ) = (x2 , θ3 ), y2 (θ3 ) = (x3 , θ3 )
implements the outcomes in X2 as intended by the social choice function f2 .

Example 3: Too many messages
Consider three type Θ3 = {θ1 , θ2 , θ3 } with two outcomes X3 = {x1 , x2 }, message sets
M3 (θ1 ) = {θ1 , θ2 }, M3 (θ2 ) = {θ2 , θ3 }, M3 (θ3 ) = {θ3 }, and utilities
u3 (x, θ)
x1
x2

θ1
0
1
9

θ2
1
0

θ3
1
0

Consider the social choice function f3 (θ1 ) = x1 , f3 (θ2 ) = f3 (θ3 ) = x2 , inducing a
utility 0 for each type. This social choice function is not M (.)-implementable. For
suppose it is M (.)-implementable by some function g3 : Θ → X. There are two
cases for g3 (θ2 ). Case 1: g3 (θ2 ) = x1 , but then type θ2 can guarantee himself 1
by sending the message θ2 , which contradicts that he is supposed to get 0 under
f3 . Case 2: g3 (θ2 ) = x2 , but then type θ1 can guarantee himself 1 by sending the
message θ2 , contradicting that he is supposed to get 0 under f3 . Note however that
by restricting the mechanism to only messages {θ1 , θ3 } ⊂ Θ and setting g3 (θ1 ) = x1
and g3 (θ3 ) = x2 , the social choice function f3 is implementable. Hence, to implement
f3 it is crucial that the agent’s communication is restricted: he is not allowed to send
the message θ2 . Because Green and Laffont define a mechanism as consisting of an
outcome function whose domain is the entire set of types Θ, they formally do not
allow such restrictions in their framework.


4

A Revelation Principle

The two last examples of the previous section suggest that for studying the restrictions
on implementable outcomes, the notion of a direct mechanism is too restrictive. From
a perspective of standard mechanism design, this seems a puzzling observation. This
section argues however that the observation is more due to a restrictive modelling of
an economic allocation rather than some deep fundamental difference to mechanism
design with verifiable information. In particular, the revelation principle obtains as
usual if an implementable allocation consists not only of the outcome x, but also the
verifiable message m that is sent.
In order to see that such a definition of an allocation is, from a mechanism design
perspective, also the more natural one, recall that mechanism design is primarily
interested in the equilibrium outcomes which a mechanism induces rather than the
specifics of the mechanism itself. More precisely, it is not the complete equilibrium
outcome that matters, but only the “components” of these equilibrium outcomes
that are relevant to the mechanism design problem. Hence, in order to model some
environment with private information as a problem of mechanism design, it is crucial
to identify first its relevant components.
Clearly, the direct pay-off relevant part, the outcome x ∈ X, is such a component.
Yet, it is important to recognize that, because the verifiable messages allow the
principal to screen among different types of agents, they are just as relevant. Put
differently, verifiable messages are screening variables and because screening variables
10

are a crucial part of the mechanism design problem, they should be included as part
of the implementable allocation.
In contrast, the tradition in the literature on mechanism design with verifiable
information includes only the outcome x ∈ X as part of the implementable allocation. Its motivation for not including the verifiable messages themselves lies in the
suggestion that sending a verifiable message is costless and, thus, pay-off irrelevant.
This view is however partially misguided, because whilst it is true that for a type
who can send a verifiable message, the cost is zero, the cost is effectively infinite for
a type who cannot send it. Hence, one can just as well argue that, in contrast to
unverifiable messages, verifiable messages actually exhibit an extreme form of payoffrelevance. Taking a pure pay-off relevance perspective, they should therefore be part
of the implementable allocation.
Importantly, the inclusion of verifiable messages as part of the implementable
allocation fully restores the revelation principle in mechanism design with verifiable
information. In order to show this formally in the original context of Green and
Laffont, one first has to make a modeling choice about an aspect, which Green and
Laffont leave unspecified: whether the verifiable messages which the agent can send
are “exhaustive”.
Subsequent literature provides two perspectives on this. By interpreting that the
agent’s verifiable message is effectively a collection of possible pieces of evidence, Bull
and Watson (2007) present a micro-foundation for the underlying verifiable messages,
which implies that the agent can only send one verifiable message. In contrast,
Deneckere and Severinov (2008) do not model this intermediate step of differentiating
between the verifiable message and its underlying pieces of evidence. As the authors
explicitly explain, without this distinction, it is appropriate to model the possibility
that the agent can send multiple verifiable messages.
For the validity of the revelation principle it is inconsequential which modeling
choice to make. For the exposition of the result, it is however less cumbersome to
follow the interpretation of Bull and Watson (2007). In this case, the verifiablemessage component of an equilibrium outcome that is induced by some mechanism is
an element of Θ, whereas under the interpretation of Deneckere and Severinov (2008),
where the agent could send multiple verifiable messages, a verifiable message is an
element of the power set 2Θ .
Given a principal-agent problem Γ = {Θ, X, M, u}, define the extended allocation set
X̂ ≡ X × Θ and the extended utility function û(x̂|θ̃) = û(x, θ|θ̃) as

u(x, θ̃)
if θ ∈ M (θ̃)
û(x, θ|θ̃) ≡
(1)
u(x, θ̃) − C otherwise.
11

with C = maxx,θ,x0 ,θ0 u(x, θ) − u(x0 , θ0 ).12,13 We can interpret the expanded structure
Γ̂ = {Θ, X̂, M, û} as representing a principal-agent problem in which the principal
wants to implement an extended social choice function fˆ : Θ → X̂ given that the
agent is privately informed about his type θ.
A social choice function fˆ is implementable if there exists some single-person decision problem in which for any type θ there exists an optimal decision inducing the
allocation fˆ(θ). A special class of such decision problems are incentive compatible
direct mechanisms defined as follows.
Definition 1̂: An incentive compatible direct mechanism in Γ̂ is a composite function
ĝ = (ĝ 1 , ĝ 2 ) with ĝ 1 : Θ → X and ĝ 2 : Θ → Θ such that
û(ĝ(θ)|θ) ≥ û(ĝ(θ0 )|θ) for any θ, θ0 ∈ Θ.

(2)

Hence, an incentive compatible direct mechanism ĝ represents a single-person
decision problem in which it is an optimal decision for the agent to report his type
truthfully. We adapt Definition 2 to Γ̂ as follows.
Definition 2̂: A social choice function fˆ : Θ → X̂ is ĝ-implementable iff the direct
mechanism ĝ = fˆ is incentive compatible.
Standard arguments yield the revelation principle for the principal-agent problem
Γ̂: If there exists some single-person decision problem in which for any type θ there
exists an optimal decision leading to the extended allocation fˆ(θ), then there exists
an incentive compatible direct mechanism with ĝ(θ) = fˆ(θ). Hence, the mechanism
ĝ implements the social choice function fˆ. Therefore the next proposition follows.
Proposition 1 (Revelation principle) Any extended allocation fˆ(θ) that is the
outcome of some single-agent decision problem in Γ̂ is ĝ-implementable.
While the previous proposition establishes a revelation principle for the principalagent problem Γ̂, it leaves open its relation to the underlying problem Γ.
12

Because Θ and X are finite, C is well-defined. If the sets Θ and X are infinite, one may take
the supremum rather than the maximum, which is well-defined provided that u is bounded. If u is
unbounded, all arguments still go through by picking, for a given social welfare function f , a large
enough (finite) value for C.
13
Extending the agent’s payoff function by introducing the prohibitively high cost C effectively
renders the agent’s action set type-independent and solves the issue pointed out in footnote 11 . It
is an illustration of the idea of Harsanyi (p. 168, 1967) that “the assumption that a given strategy
si = s0i is not available to player i is equivalent, from a game-theoretical point of view, to the
assumption that player i will never actually use strategy s [emphasis in the original].”

12

Proposition 2 Consider some principal-agent problem Γ and its corresponding extension Γ̂. If there exists some mechanism in Γ which implements the social choice
function f : Θ → X, then there exists a function θ̂ : Θ → Θ such that the extended
social choice function fˆ(·) = (f (·), θ̂(·)) is ĝ-implementable.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose some decision problem implements the social
choice function f in Γ. Then for type θ, some decision(s) leading to the outcome
f (θ) and some verifiable message θ̂(θ) ∈ M (θ) that he sends when achieving outcome
f (θ) is optimal. Consider the direct mechanism ĝ : Θ → X̂ with ĝ 1 (θ) = f (θ) ∈ X
and ĝ 2 (θ) = θ̂(θ) ∈ M (θ) ⊂ Θ. Fix some θ ∈ Θ. Inequality (2) holds for any
θ0 s.t. θ̂(θ0 ) 6∈ M (θ), because u(f (θ0 ), θ) − C ≤ minx,θ̃ u(x, θ̃) ≤ û(f (θ), θ̂(θ)), since
θ̂(θ) ∈ M (θ). Moreover, the optimality of the decision(s) leading to f (θ) and message
θ̂(θ) imply that inequality (2) holds for any θ0 s.t. θ̂(θ0 ) ∈ M (θ). It then follows that
the constructed ĝ satisfies (2) for any θ, θ0 ∈ Θ so that ĝ is an incentive compatible
direct mechanism in Γ̂. Hence fˆ is ĝ-implementable.
Q.E.D.
The main insight is therefore that, despite the presence of (partially) verifiable
information, there is nothing peculiar about the principal-agent problem if we, appropriately, specify the concept of an implementable allocation. We can then use the
revelation principle as usual to analyze the class of implementable allocations for all
possible mechanisms. In particular, the incentive constraints (2) full characterize the
set of implementable social choice functions fˆ. Taking the first component of fˆ gives
us the set of implementable outcomes x ∈ X.

5

Inalienable Mechanisms

Proposition 2 provides the answer to the question how to characterize the set implementable social choice functions f for any Γ: First characterize the set of implementable social choice functions fˆ in the corresponding problem Γ̂ by the incentive
constraints (2). The set all implementable social choice function f can then be obtained in a second step by taking the first component of each implementable fˆ.
The procedure characterizes the set of implementable outcome via mechanisms
ĝ = (ĝ 1 , ĝ 2 ) that map into the extended allocation X × Θ rather than the outcome
space X. One interpretation of such mechanisms is that they are evidence-conditional.
The agent receives the allocation ĝ 1 (θ) ∈ X conditional on presenting the evidence
ĝ 2 (θ) ∈ Θ. While the previous section shows that evidence-conditional mechanisms
allow us to characterize the set of implementable outcomes with the usual tools of
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mechanism design and, in particular, the notion of incentive compatible direct mechanisms, one may object that these mechanisms may be too coercive for some practical
environments, because they effectively force the agent to present his evidence.14
This has lead the mechanism design literature with verifiability to introduce the
concept of inalienability, which is the notion that the principal should not be able to
force the agent to present any evidence, if the agent does not want to. The evidenceconditional mechanisms ĝ have the strong flavor that they violate this notion, because
the agent is forced to give up the evidence ĝ 2 (θ) if he wants the allocation ĝ 1 (θ).
Following the concern that evidence-conditional mechanisms violate the notion of
inalienability, we introduce the following definition:
Definition: An inalienable mechanism (M, g) consists of a set M and an outcome
function g : M → X.
Hence, the restrictive notion of an inalienable mechanism is that, just as in the
original framework of Green and Laffont, it maps into the set of outcomes X instead of some larger set. While clearly relevant from a practical perspective, it is
however important to be aware that, from a pure mechanism design perspective, the
introduction of inalienability is a restriction on the choice of mechanisms that is not
directly related to the presence of asymmetric information. Clearly, any additional
restrictions on the available mechanisms can only reduce the set of implementable
allocations.
Taking the concern of inalienability seriously, an interesting question is however to
ask how restrictive the introduction of such mechanisms is in terms of implementability. Ideally, the set of implementable allocation with inalienable mechanisms coincides
with the set of implementable allocations via unrestricted mechanisms.
One example of an inalienable mechanism is a direct mechanism, g : Θ → X,
as modelled in Green and Laffont. Yet, Examples 2 and 3 show that the set of
implementable allocations via these mechanisms is strictly smaller than the set of
implementable allocations via unrestricted mechanisms. Indeed, starting with a direct
mechanism of Green and Laffont and broadening it by adding unverifiable messages
or reducing it further by restricting communication, still yields a mechanism that
is inalienable. Hence, the examples show that, in general, there exist inalienable
mechanisms which can implement outcomes that are not implementable via a direct
mechanism in the sense of Green and Laffont.
The remainder of this section shows that starting with a direct mechanism of
Green and Laffont and using the two elementary operations of broadening it by
14

E.g., the “right to remain silent” is a right recognized in many of the world’s legal systems.
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adding unverifiable messages and limiting it by restricting communication, obtains
an inalienable mechanism that implements an outcome that is implementable by
some non-inalienable evidence-conditional mechanism ĝ. This result implies that
inalienable mechanisms are not restrictive in terms of the implementable outcomes
they induce. Because the proof is constructive, it shows exactly how to obtain the
inalienable mechanism that implements the same outcome as its evidence-conditional
counterpart ĝ.
Given a principal-agent problem Γ with the message correspondence M (.), first
extend the agent’s message as follows:
M̂ (θ) = M (θ) × Θ.
As before an interpretation of this extension is that, in addition to a message from
M (θ), an agent of type θ also makes some non-verifiable claim about his type Θ.
However, this additional non-verifiable message does not necessarily be a literal claim
about the agent’s type. Another interpretation is that the agent has to say some
natural number between 1 and K, which, given that there are K types, effectively is
like reporting some Θ.
Let M̂ ≡ ∪θ∈Θ M̂ (θ) and define a mechanism as follows:
Definition 1̄: A mechanism (M̄ , ḡ) in Γ consists of a set M̄ ⊆ M̂ such that M̄ ∩
M̂ (θ) 6= ∅ for all θ ∈ Θ and an outcome function ḡ : M̄ → X.
Hence, a mechanism (M̄ , ḡ) is inalienable. Moreover, it is constructed by starting
with the message sets M (θ), which Green and Laffont consider as primitives of the underlying principal-agent problem, extending them by adding non-verifiable messages,
in the form of the set Θ, to obtain the extended messages set M̂ , and, subsequently,
restricting this overall message set to M̄ , which is a (possibly strict) subset of M̂ .
Hence, if, in the mechanism design problem, the principal has the ability to perform
the two elementary operations of adding non-verifiable messages and restricting the
agent’s communication, then it is compelling that the principal can use mechanisms
as defined in Definition 1̄.
As before, a mechanism (M̄ , ḡ) presents the agent of type θ with a single-person
decision problem in which he has to pick some m from the message set M̄ that is
consistent with his message set M̂ (θ). That is, the mechanism induces a response
rule φ̄ḡ : Θ → M̄ defined by15
φ̄ḡ (θ) ∈ arg

max

u(ḡ(m), θ).

m∈M̂ (θ)∩M̄
15

The provision in Definition 1̄ that M̂ (θ) ∩ M̄ 6= ∅ for all θ ∈ Θ implies that the agent does not
maximize over an empty set.

15

Because the function φ̄ḡ maps Θ into the Cartesian product Θ × Θ, it is convenient
to write the composed function φ̄ḡ component-wise as φ̄ḡ = (φ̄1ḡ , φ̄2ḡ ) of two functions
φ̄1ḡ : Θ → Θ and φ̄2ḡ : Θ → Θ.
The adapted notions of a mechanism and a response rule lead to the following
concept of implementability.
Definition 2̄: A social choice function f : Θ → X is M̄ -implementable in Γ iff there
exists a mechanism (M̄ , ḡ) with an outcome function ḡ such that:
ḡ(φ̄ḡ (θ)) = f (θ) for any θ in Θ,

(3)

where φ̄ḡ (·) is a response rule with respect to the mechanism (M̄ , ḡ).
The next proposition makes precise the idea that any implementable outcome is
implementable by an inalienable mechanism (M̄ , ḡ).
Proposition 3 Consider a principal-agent problem Γ and the corresponding problem
Γ̂. If fˆ = (x̂, θ̂) is ĝ-implementable in Γ̂ and θ̂(θ) ∈ M (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, then f = x̂
is M̄ -implementable in Γ.
Proof of Proposition 3: Fix fˆ = (x̂, θ̂) and define M̄ as
M̄ = {(θ̂(θi ), θi ) : θi ∈ Θ}.
Because θ̂(θ) ∈ M (θ), it holds by construction of M̂ (θ) that M̄ ⊂ ∪θ M̂ (θ). Define
the outcome function ḡ : M̄ → X as ḡ(θ̂(θ), θ) = x̂(θ) for any (θ̂(θ), θ) ∈ M̄ . Note
M̂ (θi ) ∩ M̄ = (θ̂(θi ), i) 6= ∅ for any θi ∈ Θ. Hence, (M̄ , ḡ) is a mechanism according
to Definition 1̄. Moreover, because M̂ (θi ) ∩ M̄ = (θ̂(θi ), θi ) is a singleton, (θ̂(θ), θ)
is a response rule with respect to the mechanism (M̄ , ḡ). Hence, φ̄ḡ (θ) = (θ̂(θ), θ)
so that ḡ(φ̄ḡ (θ)) = ḡ(θ̂(θ), θ) = x̂(θ) = f (θ). Therefore, f = x̂ is M̄ -implementable.
Q.E.D.
By constructively deriving the incentive compatible mechanism ĝ that implements
the same outcome as some inalienable mechanism (M̄ , ḡ), the next proposition makes
precise the converse of the previous proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a principal-agent problem Γ and the corresponding problem Γ̂. If f is M̄ -implementable in Γ, then the social choice function fˆ = (f, φ̄1ḡ )
is ĝ-implementable in Γ̂, where φ̄1ḡ is the first component of the response rule φ̄ḡ
corresponding to the outcome function ḡ satisfying (3).
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Proof of Proposition 4: Given f in Γ is M̄ -implementable, there is a ḡ and an associated response rule φ̄ḡ = (φ̄1ḡ , φ̄2ḡ ) satisfying (3). Fixing functions (ḡ, φ̄1ḡ , φ̄2ḡ ), consider
the social choice function fˆ = (f, φ̄1ḡ ) in Γ̂ and the direct mechanism ĝ = fˆ. The propostion follows if ĝ is incentive compatible, i.e. satisfies (2). To show this, fix a type
θ ∈ Θ. It follows that û(ĝ(θ), θ) = û(f (θ), φ̄1ḡ (θ)|θ) = u(f (θ), θ), because ĝ = fˆ =
(f, φ̄ḡ ) and φ̄1ḡ (θ) ∈ M (θ). Hence, we have to show that û(ĝ(θ0 )|θ) = û(f (θ0 ), φ̄1ḡ (θ0 )) ≤
u(f (θ), θ) for any θ0 ∈ Θ. Note first that while it holds φ̄ḡ (θ0 ) ∈ M̄ , we can have
φ̄1ḡ (θ0 ) 6∈ M (θ) or φ̄1ḡ (θ0 ) ∈ M (θ). First, suppose that φ̄1ḡ (θ0 ) 6∈ M (θ), it then follows
û(ĝ(θ0 )|θ) = u(f (θ0 ), θ) − C ≤ maxx̃,θ̃ u(x̃, θ̃) − C = minx̃,θ̃ u(x̃, θ̃) ≤ u(f (θ), θ). Next,
suppose that φ̄1ḡ (θ0 ) ∈ M (θ), it then follows û(ĝ(θ0 )|θ) = u(f (θ0 ), θ) = u(ḡ(φ̄ḡ (θ0 )), θ) ≤
u(ḡ(φ̄ḡ (θ)), θ), where the inequality follows because φ̄ḡ (θ) maximizes u(ḡ(m), θ) over
all m ∈ M̂ (θ) ∩ M̄ , which includes φ̄ḡ (θ0 ).
Q.E.D.
Combining these two propositions with the previous two implies that Definition
1̄ gives a canonical representation of mechanisms in the sense that, in terms of implementable outcomes, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to these
mechanisms; any implementable outcome is implementable by some mechanism corresponding to Definition 1̄.
Example 1 revisited:
As an illustration to see how one can check the implementability of any social choice
function in any principal-agent problem Γ and find the inalienable mechanism which
implements it, reconsider the principal-agent problem Γ1 = (Θ1 , X1 , M1 , u1 ) of example 1 and the social choice function f1 . First construct the hypothetical principalagent problem Γ̂1 = (Θ1 , X1 × Θ1 , M1 , û1 ) where the hypothetical utility function û1
follows from its definition in (1):
û1 (x, θ|θ1 )
x1
x2

θ1
10
15

θ2 θ3
10 0
15 5

û1 (x, θ|θ2 )
x1
x2

θ1 θ2 θ3
-5 5 5
0 10 10

û1 (x, θ|θ3 ) θ1 θ2 θ3
x1 0 0 10
x2 5 5 15

Next check whether there exists a social choice function fˆ1 = (f1 , θ̂1 ) that is
ĝ-implementable in Γ̂1 . Given that the revelation principle holds in Γ̂, this can
be done as usual: find an incentive compatible direct mechanism ĝ1 = (ĝ11 , ĝ12 ) :
Θ → X̂ with ĝ11 = f1 and ĝ12 = θ̂1 which satisfies the familiar incentive compatible
conditions (2). Using these incentive constraints one can verify that ĝ1 (θ1 ) = (x1 , θ1 ),
ĝ1 (θ2 ) = ĝ1 (θ3 ) = (x2 , θ3 ) is such an incentive compatible direct mechanism. Hence,
the conclusion follows that f1 is indeed M̄ -implementable in Γ1 .
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While this procedure confirms that f1 is M̄ -implementable by the familiar means
of checking incentive constraints of direct mechanisms, it does not yield the mechanism (M̄1 , ḡ1 ) which actually implements f1 in the principal-agent problem Γ1 . The
constructive proof of Proposition 3 shows how to recover this mechanism from ĝ1 .
Using that ĝ1 = (ĝ11 , ĝ12 ) = (f1 , θ̂1 ) = fˆ1 , it follows
M̄1 = {(θ̂1 (θi ), θi ) : θi ∈ Θ} = {(ĝ12 (θi ), θi ) : θi ∈ Θ} = {(θ1 , θ1 ), (θ3 , θ2 ), (θ3 , θ3 )}.
This set yields the required ḡ1 after linking it to the social choice function f1 by
setting ḡ1 (θ̂(θ), θ) = fˆ11 (θ) = f1 (θ) for each (θ̂(θ), θ) ∈ M̄1 . For Example 1, this yields
ḡ1 (θ1 , θ1 ) = x1 , ḡ1 (θ3 , θ2 ) = ḡ1 (θ3 , θ3 ) = x2 .
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Conclusion

This paper argues that, in their specific modeling of partially verifiable information,
the seminal paper of Green and Laffont (1986) and subsequent literature implicitly
restrict the notion of an implementable allocation. It, moreover, demonstrates a revelation principle in its full generality after expanding the notion of an implementable
allocation without affecting the underlying information and verifiability structure.
As usual, the obtained revelation principle allows a complete characterization of the
set of implementable allocations by incentive constraints. In addition, it shows that
any outcome associated with some (extended) implementable allocation is also implementable under the restricted interpretation of an allocation, provided that the
mechanism designer is allowed to expand communication by adding unverifiable messages and to restrict communication by limiting the use of messages. These results
lead to the conclusion that conceptual problems with the revelation principle are more
related to a limited interpretation of an allocation and the implicit limitations on constructing these mechanisms rather than to the presence of verifiable information per
se.
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